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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
,\HTIE i\HSSIE BANKS, '} 
Plaintiff and Appellant, r 
1;s. ; Case No. 10854 
HOY SHIVERS, ~ 
Defendant and Respondent) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Tlm; is an action for compensatory and punitive 
damages by Appellant for an alleged assault and battery 
r:ommittecl upon Appellant by Respondent. Respondent 
tiled herein a Counterclaim for damages alleging assault 
and battery by Appellant upon Respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'11he case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury. 
'l'he Court submitted the issue to the jury for a general 
verdict, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of 
action against Appellant on her Complaint and no cause 
of action for Respondent on his Counterclaim. The Ap-
pellant tirndy moved the Court for a new trial, which 
motion the Trial Court denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the J·ud : 
. gJnent !Ji 
the .1ury and the Trial Court's order denyi A 
, . ~ M 
ant s ::\lotion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of the facts is incomplete , 
and in part incorrect. It is axiomatic that, in view o! 
the jury's finding against A ppe11ant, this Court iiill 
view the evidence in light most favorable to such find 
ings. Accordingly, the Court's attention is invited to fo, 
facts from the record in the following particulars. 
1'he evening of April 19, 1967, Respondent, in com. 
pan.v with one Henry King, came to the apartment of 
Appellant and one Mary Graham for the purpose ot 1 
having Miss Graham cook some chicken for them. (Tr 
43 and 44) When Messrs. Shivers and King arrived, 
they were invited into the apartment of Miss Graham 
and 1\f iss Banks. (Tr. 14 lns 11-15) Only the four per- , 
sons named were present at this time, and they were 
later joined by one Lou Ann Martinez. (Tr. 15 ln 22) 
The room where the incident in question occurred 
has a kitchen in one end divided from the rest of the 
room by a divider approximately three feet high. (Ex. 
P-1 and Tr. 32, Ins 17-22) After exchanging greetings, 
King and Graham went to the kitchen area to begin 
preparing the chicken; and Appellant and Respondent. 
3 
rrrnaiM(l in the living and dining area. (Tr. 15) When 
~!artinez entered the apartment, she went to the kitchen 
;i]'(·a. (Tr. 29, lns lG-30) 
lnitially, Hespondent had been seated on the couch 
m tlw liYing area studying. He stood up and walked to 
tl 11, ~aid di,·ider and began playing with a stack of cards 
'litre. He asked who they belonged to, and Appellant 
rl'plie(l the~- ,,-ere hers and directed Respondent to put 
rllem down, which he did. (Tr. 30, Ins 13-30) Appellant 
tl1en·npon got up from her seat at the table (See Ex. 
i'-1 ), rPmoved the cards from the room, and returned. 
1 Tr. 31) .\ conversation then ensued which triggered 
tl1e pvents giving ri3e to Appellant's claim, the sub-
~':ance and demeanor of which the record reveals some 
cnnflirt concerning. 
Appellant, in her Brief, pages 3 and 4, cites her 
own testimony that Respondent said to her, "I ought 
to knnek you up side of your nappy head," (Tr. 16, Ins 
2-± & 2fi) whereupon Respondent moved toward Appell-
ant in a rapid manner and clapped his hands near her 
face. ('fr. 17) Omitted from Appellant's Statement of 
the Facts was the testimony of Mr. King on cross-exam-
ination lff Mr. Yan Seiver when he testified as follows: 
Q. .\nd what did he sayr 
A And he say. ''What if I don't,'' like that. 
Q. Did he say, "What if I hit you~" 
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A. Yeah, he said, "What if I hit you'" l'k 
· 1 e that. 
Q. Did he say this in a loud manner~ 
A. No. He was smiling while he was sayin 11 . g l11, 
Q. Now "What if I hit you?" 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, no,v, was Miss Banks facing \h~ ' 
table at this time 1 
A. Yes, she was facing this way, yes. 
Q. She didn't see the manner in which Mr. Shiv. 
ers tendered this statement; is that correct: 
A. She was watching him while he said it. 
Q. Well, now, can you describe the smile that 
was on his face? 
A. Well, like he smiles all the time. You know. 
Just like one does. That's the way he talks. 
Q. Was it said in a manner-
A. It was in a playful manner. That's what it 
was. In a playful manner. 
Q. But the comment wasn't playful. He said. 
''What if I hit you?'' 
A. Well, that was a playful manner. 
(gmphasis Added) (Tr. 57 lns. 4-26) 
Also omitted from Appellant's Statement of the 
5 
fad:s was Appellant's statement m her deposition, 
"-Jwn, under questioning by Mr. Hoggan, she testified 
n~ follows : 
(~. Okay. Let me just go back over this with you 
for a minute. Now when he said: "I ought to hit 
mu beside your nappy head," did that generate 
!'ear in you'! 
A. l fear no one. 
Q. I see 
A. Because I feel that all anyone can do is kill 
me, and if it's in.stant it doesn't bother me at all. 
Q. So ~-ou weren't afraid by what he said T 
,\. I'.'o, I wasn't afraid. 
(1£rnphasis added) (Desposition of Appellant, page 18, 
linrs l 0-18) 
After Respondent had clapped his hands, he then 
moved away from Appellant toward the door; where-
upon. Appellant jumped up and ran toward Respondent. 
Respondent turned to face Appellant. (Tr. 58, Ins 3-16) 
Appellant, at page 4 of her Brief, states that Respondent 
then leaned ltis chest against Appellant. Appellant so 
testified. (Tr. 18, Ins 15-17) However, Mr. King testified 
that ''as soon as he (Respondent) turned around, she 
I Appellant) ·was there with her chest all up in his face 
.... " (Tr. 58, Ins 20 and 21; see also Tr. 47, Ins 15-19; 
and Tr. 58 and 59) 
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Appellant then began hitting Respondent · 
m t~, 
stomach and face. (Tr. 47 and 48; Tr. 18, ln 20· 'l' . 
, r. 
Tr. 73, lns 25-30; and Tr. 74, lns 1-3) Respondent \· PU~ led 
Appellant away, and she fell backward onto the floi)J 
(Tr. 33, lns 26-30; Tr. 48, lns 10-26) Appellant contend, 
in her f'tatement of facts that Respondent came towafr 
Appellant as she was on the floor. (Brief p. 4) However 
both .i\Iartinez and King testified that Shivers w~, 
heading toward the couch where his hat was; and whµn 
he came near Appellant, she kicked him. Responden; 
then turned to face Appellant, and she kicked him in ' 
the groin (Tr. 48 and 49; Tr. 35, lns 18-30; and Tr. 361 
Respondent then held Appellant's hands and struck 
her once with an open hand to restrain her. (Tr. 35, ln~ 
7-10 and Tr. 49, lns 9 and 10) At this point, Mr.King 
restrained Respondent and Appellant got up. Respondent 
sensed blood coming from his mouth and, in the heat 
of the sequence of events, reached out and took Appellant 
by the neck, pushing her against the wall. (Tr. 49, 50, ' 
and 51) Again, Mr. King restrained Respondent; and 
King, Martinez, and Respondent left the apartment. 
On this state of the record, the jury returned aver-
dict against Appellant on her Complaint, no cause ot 
action. Appellant moved for a new trial, which motion 
was denied and hense, this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THF~ COl~RT IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE 
.ffRY CORRECTLY DEFINED AN ASSAULT AND, 
[~ ANY EYENT, AND UNDER ANY DEFINITION 
OF ASSArLT, THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND NO 
_\SSAI'LT HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY RESPON-
DENT rPON APPELLANT. 
'l1he Court instructed the Jury on assault as follows: 
"An assault is an unlawful attempt coupled with 
a present ability to commit an injury on the per-
son of another.'' 
Appellant excepted to this instruction (Tr. 89) and 
cites to this Court in support of her contention that the 
Honorable Trial Court's definition was erroneous, the 
Restatement of Torts and Prosser. While both are emi-
nent authorities, neither could be considered paramount 
to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court which, in 
the ease of Ganaway v. Salt Lake Dramatic Association, 
17 l't. 37, 53 P. 830, held the only thing wrong with the 
following definition of assault: 
·'An assault is an attempt, coupled with an abil-
ity, to commit a violent injury upon the person of 
another." (emphasis added) 
was inclusion of the word "violent." 
It will be observed that if the word "violent" is 
omitted from the definition in the Ganaway case, it be-
8 
comes practically word for word the same as the lY, 
Court's definition in the instant case. The Trial Couri,~: 
definition of assault comports with the defi'n·t· 
1 
· 
1 ion 01 
assault given by this Court. · 
Nor is this Court alone in so defining an assault. In 1 
the relatively recent case of Cook v. Kinzua Pine )jj]l, 
Co., 207 Ore. 34, 293 P2d 717, the Oregon Supreme Court 
defined a civil assault as: 
'' ... an ~t~empt with force or violence to dG 
corporal mJury to another from malice or wan. 
tonness or is an intentional attempt to do vinlenr, 
Io anotl1er's person coupled with present abil1t1, 
to carry intention into effect.'' (emphasis added) 
But, assuming, without admitting, for the purpo~e 
of argument, that the Restatement of Torts definition 
quoted from Section 21, Subsection 1 at page 7 of Ap. 
pellant 's Brief is the law, the result of the case would 
have been the same for the reasons: 
First, that the act of Respondent did not put Ap· 
pellant '' ... in apprehension of immediate and harm· 
ful or offensive contact ... '' In her deposition, Appel· 
lant stated that Respondent's words did not make her 
afraid. (Appellant's deposition, page 18) 
Second, that the apprehension mentioned in the 
Restatement is apprehension that would be caused in the 
mind of a reasonable person. (Prosser on Torts, 2nd 
Edition, page 35) Mr. King testified when being cross· 
examined hy Appellant's Attorney that Respondent and 
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Appellant were facing each other when Respondent 
.-aid he would hit her and clapped hi.s hands in front of 
h.;i· face and that Respondent was smiling and acting 
in a playful manner. (Tr. 57) Such action, under any 
circumstances, would not create apprehension in the 
utind of a reasonable person. 
'l'hird. that '' ... apprehension is not justified 
where they (words) indicate that the defendant is offer-
ing a hlow in jest ... " (Prosser on Torts, 2nd Edition, 
page 36) The testimony of Mr. King cited above gives 
evidence from which a jury could conclude that the 
wordR and gestures of Respondent were in jest. 
Fourth. that Respondent did not intend to '' 
inflict a harmful or offensive contact . . . '' on Appel-
lant (Restatement of Torts, Sec. 21, Subsection 1) After 
clapping his hands, Respondent walked away from Ap-
pellant. ('l'r. 57, Ins 26-30) The record is void of any 
showing of belligerence on Respondent's part to this 
point. Respondent testified he didn't intend to touch 
Appellant when he clapped his hands and that had he 
so intended he would have touched her. (Tr. 78, Ins 16-30) 
As to the other action triggered by the hand clap, 
it is Respondent's contention that if anyone was assaul-
ted, it was Respondent. The sequence of events outlined 
in detail in Respondent's statement of facts shows that 
Appellant first pushed her chest against Respondent and 
then struck Respondent in the stomach and mouth; that 
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m self defense, Respondent pushed A1)pellant t , 
0 i),, 
floor; that Appellant then kicked Respondent r 
m tl11' 
side and in the groin; that in response to th1' ~ act' ~ ion a1,, 
provocation, Respondent hit Appellant once with un 
open hand and grabbed her by the throat and p ,
1 
, u~ 1~1 1 
her against the wall. No where in this sequence of ewm. 
is there a fact which would alter the jury's defiio!i 
against Appellant under any definition of a civil a8sau\: 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELL , 
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AS THE .JrJt'i 
ON DISPUTED EVIDENCE RESOLVED THE 
FACTS AGAINST APPELLANT ON HER cm1. 
PLAINT, AND THE JURY'S FINDINGS WERE 
B01'TOMED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that: (1) Respondent used ex-
cessive force against Appellant in repulsing an attack 
on him; (2) Respondent eannot justify his action on thr 
ground of self defense; and ( 3) Respondent had a dun 
to withdraw. (Appellant's Brief, pages 10 and 11) 
·with reference to the first contention, the Court in 
instruction number three to the jury stated: 
"One who is assaulted, with or without pro-
vocation, may use reasonable force to repel thP 1 
attack without being liable for an assa~lt a~d 
batterv. But one may not use excessive force 1~ 
repelling the attack, but only that amount ot 
force which ma:' reasonably appear to the (sicl 
11 
per:-;on attacked to be necessary to repel his ad-
yersary at the time ... " (R. 33) 
Appellant did not except to this instruction (Tr. 89 
and 90) and under rules needing no citation of authority 
,rJien tlw jury found under this instruction against Ap-
nellant on <lisputed evidence, its finding will not be dis-,. 
turbed unless unfounded on competent evidence. In this 
('a~e. the evidence of the degree of force used by Appel-
lnnt \\as <lisrmted and eertainly there was competent 
1,ndenee upon ·which the jury bottomed its findings and 
decision that, in effect, no excessive force had been 
1 t~f·d by Appellant. The jury's finding need not and 
~hould not he disturbed. 
Contentions (2) and (3) will be considered together. 
The first time Appellant told Respondent to leave 
was when Respondent clapped his hands and walked 
away from her. She immediately jumped up and shouted 
"Get out of here." (See testimony of Martinez, Tr. 31, 
Ins 22-30) When Respondent turned around, Appellant 
was .iumping against him and immediately began hitting 
him Assuming for argument, without admitting, that 
Respondent had a duty to retreat, Respondent had no 
chance to retreat but was given only two alternatives: 
stand and take it or defend himself. He chose the latter 
and, after repelling Appellant's attack, started to get 
his hat. (Tr. 48, Ins 16-26 and Tr. 49, lns 5-10) 
At this point, Appellant again kicked him on the 
12 
side and in the grom. (Tr. 36, lns 3-12 and Tr . .f!), \;J, 
5-10) 
One is led to the question, ""What could a 1, , ecison. 
able person have done under the circumstance~ t]::i, 
Respondent didn't do~" and to conclude with the .iu :· 
that Respondent acted in self defense as his only rr:al 
istic alternative inasmuch as the swift and continuou, 
attack of Appellant made retreat under the ciremmtan 
ees impossible. 
Finally, it should be observed that Lou Ann ~lar­
inez, who was Appellant's witness, gives a most re. 
vealing and frank account of the incident. One cam:-:1: 
read her entire testimony without being left with tnc 
feeling and led to the conclusion that the jury correcTI: 
decided the facts of this case against Plaintiff on hPr 
Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury was properly instructed and on conflicting 
but competent evidence found against Appellant on her 
Complaint. The Trial Court correctly overruled Appel-
lant's Motion for a New Trial The decision of the jury 
and the Trial Court should be affirmed by this Court 
Respectfully submitted. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorney for Respondent 
